Berkeley Faculty React to Election Result: What to expect of the Trump 2.0 100 Day Agenda

The election of Donald Trump to a second term as president promises to bring dramatic change to policies coming out of Washington and how agencies approach their implementation and regulatory roles. To learn more about what we might expect, BPPJ asked UC Berkeley scholars to share their reactions to the election result. Faculty members were posed the following question: “With respect to (a particular policy area), what will you be looking out for in the first one hundred days of the Trump administration?”

Below, Ben Metcalf, Janet Napolitano, Caitlin Patler, and Daniel J. Sargent share their insights concerning what a second Trump presidency bodes for housing affordability, security, immigration, and U.S. foreign policy, respectively. 

Faculty Member: Ben Metcalf

Topic: Housing Affordability

What Can We Expect to See On Housing Affordability from President Trump in 2025

At President Trump’s election night speech, he highlighted the broadened electoral coalition that propelled him to victory, noting support from Latinos, Asian Americans, youth, and other traditionally Democratic constituencies. Although there are varied reasons behind this shift, post-Covid inflation, and particularly frustration over rising rents and the elusive prospect of homeownership clearly played a role. His campaign committed to boost housing supply and increase homeownership but his promises raise concerns: 

  • Cutting Red Tape While Trump’s pledge to immediately reduce regulations to spur housing development aligns with an emerging bipartisan consensus, his focus on federal regulations overlooks what are generally understood to be the primary regulatory cost drivers: locally enacted zoning and land use controls and state building codes. Indeed, his stated support for protecting the suburbs and encouraging exclusionary zoning is likely to undercut gains his administration achieves by reducing or eliminating federal regulations.
  • Mass Deportation Trump’s plan to deport undocumented immigrants, purportedly with the anticipated side benefit of reducing housing demand and thus home prices, faces practical and ethical challenges. The removal of millions of people from the United States will provoke fear, economic disruption and would take years to actually happen. Yet the threat of deportation will have immediate consequences—detering the substantial undocumented workforce from showing up at construction sites, exacerbating shortages in a sector already struggling to find skilled workers and contain growing construction costs.
  • Tax Reform Trump has committed to promptly lowering federal taxes, especially for corporations. While this can reasonably be expected to stimulate housing construction (and has already buoyed homebuilder stock prices), there is a downside. Federal deficit spending due to foregone tax revenue will increase the pressure to make offsetting cuts in non-defense discretionary spending, including housing assistance programs administered by the US Department of Housing and Urban Development. And, more immediately, the prospect of tax cuts are already increasing long-term bond yields, raising borrowing costs for both homebuilders and homebuyers.
  • Tariffs Trump’s proposed tariff hikes on imported goods, such as Canadian lumber and Chinese steel, pose another threat to the housing sector. Since the costs of increased tariffs are generally passed to consumers, homebuilders will face higher material expenses, raising costs and making it even harder to build homes.

It’s hard to see how Trump’s housing plans provide immediate relief for rising rents and home prices. Perhaps the best hope on this topic is Trump’s knack for evolving his policies to meet the political moment. As the challenge of governing—and the electoral reality of keeping a broadened base of renters within the Republican tent—becomes clear, he may shift course to find more constructive housing policies. But until that time, a growing burden is likely to fall on states and localities to address the very real housing challenges facing millions of Americans across the country.

– Ben Metcalf

Associate Research Professor, UC Berkeley Department of City and Regional Planning

Professor Metcalf serves as Practice Director for UC Berkeley’s Abbey Master of Real Estate Development + Design. He is also the Managing Director of the Terner Center for Housing Innovation at UC Berkeley and serves as Chief Executive Officer of Terner Labs.

Faculty Member: Janet Napolitano

Topic: Security Policy

The first thing to look for regarding security policy under a second Trump administration is who he appoints to key positions. Most people think of the Cabinet and, no doubt, the Secretaries of Defense, State, DHS, and Energy as well as the Attorney General will be important. But there are other positions that play critical roles where national security is concerned: someone will replace the estimable Bill Burns as CIA director; Trump may pull a Comey and fire Chris Wray, the current FBI director; there will be a new head of CISA; an entire new cast occupying important sub-cabinet roles at Defense; and a new Director of National Intelligence. One position to pay special attention to is who Trump names as his National Security Advisor. Does he appoint someone with serious national security experience or does he select someone more junior, perhaps even from his campaign staff? 

Another, related phenomenon to watch for is the extent of the brain drain from the DC national security community. Trump had a famously contentious relationship with both his generals and with the intelligence community and he probably would be untroubled if many left, taking with them years of experience and expertise. Security policy depends on policymakers and on those charged with implementing whatever policy is decided upon: policy is people. Expect some major changes and gaps during the new Administration.

Beyond the people Trump picks and those who decide to leave there are a multitude of security challenges Trump must confront. I will be watching his dealings with Putin and how he handles (or abandons) Ukraine as well as how he deals with Israel and the Mideast. Foreign adversaries like China and Iran could well decide that the first 100 days would be an ideal time to test U.S. resolve. For example, China could increase its activities around Taiwan or Iran could mount a cyberattack against U.S. critical infrastructure. Transitions are always periods of greater vulnerability and this transition could be particularly fraught.

Finally, Trump has already indicated that he wants to move swiftly to reverse any U.S. initiatives regarding climate change. Climate is a fundamental security issue. Rising sea levels, increased temperatures, and changing weather patterns affect everything from how we arm and deploy our troops, to geopolitical unrest related to climate, to the safety and security of the homeland itself. It remains to be seen what steps Trump will take or how successful the Biden administration has been in Trump-proofing its climate change actions. But climate is an existential risk and is likely to become more so in a second Trump administration.

There are many more things to pay attention to during the outset of the new administration where security is concerned: relationships with our allies and partners; NATO; increasing tensions in space and the Arctic to name but a few. Here’s the question—will we be safer and more secure under a Trump administration than we were under Biden, or Bush, or Obama? I have my doubts.

– Janet Napolitano, 

Professor of Public Policy and Founder and Faculty Director of the Center for Security in Politics 

Professor Napolitano served as the president of the University of California from 2013 to 2020, as the U.S. Secretary of Homeland Security from 2009 to 2013, as Governor of Arizona from 2003 to 2009, as Attorney General of Arizona from 1998 to 2003, and as U.S. Attorney for the District of Arizona from 1993 to 1997.

Faculty Member: Caitlin Patler

Topic: Immigration Policy

Trump 2.0 on Immigration: Mass deportation and restrictions on admissions

According to AP VoteCast, 20% of voters reported immigration was the top issue factoring into their votes in the 2024 election, second only to the economy (39%), making the issue five times as important to voters than in 2020. This is perhaps unsurprising: racist, xenophobic, and false rhetoric about immigrants was front and center during this election cycle.

The first 100 days of the Trump administration will likely include “an extreme expansion of [Trump’s] first-term crackdown,” which included 1,025 actions aimed to curtail immigrant admissions to the U.S. (undocumented and documented alike, and including refugees, students, and more) and to restrict immigrants’ rights. Many of these actions occurred very early in Trump’s presidency, including the now-infamous “Muslim Ban” and Executive Order 13767 which aimed to widely expand deportation (President Biden ended both these measures on his first day in office). But while we can surely expect swift and harsh actions on immigration, we can also expect organized legal and social resistance to such actions.

The crackdown

Stephen Miller, the architect of many of Trump’s earlier immigrant policies, has promised “Trump will unleash the vast arsenal of federal powers to implement the most spectacular migration crackdown.” He will likely re-implement bans on immigrants from certain countries, gut the U.S. refugee program, and pressure other nations to sign “safe third country” agreements to take in asylum-seekers. 

But the most widespread effort—and the most draconian—will likely be to vastly expand the detention and deportation of undocumented immigrants by, e.g., mandating increased collaboration between local police and immigration authorities (and punishing local jurisdictions that refuse), infusing resources into increased surveillance and arrest, building massive detention camps to house apprehended immigrants, and expanding “expedited removal” programs that fast-track deportation by denying immigrants the opportunity to plead or appeal their case in immigration court. 

Yet even these efforts combined will not remove all undocumented immigrants from the U.S. or stop all future undocumented immigrants from coming. Indeed, the economic and political conditions in sending countries and in the U.S. that drive migration will continue to exist. However, the massive ramp-up of deportation will have massive and destructive consequences for the economy and for society, including the potential to separate millions of U.S. citizen children from their parents.

Resistance 

These potential actions are not only troubling, but also expensive and potentially illegal. We should therefore also expect to see organized resistance from civil and human rights organizations, pro-immigrant politicians, and immigrants themselves, who built up a litigation and policy toolkit during the first presidency. For example, Governor Newsom has called for a special session of California’s Legislature to “Trump-proof” the state’s laws (California filed over 120 lawsuits against the Trump administration during his first term). These resistance efforts will continue to be led by immigrants, including the hundreds of thousands of DACA recipients, who have lived in the US for years, love this country, and know that their “home is here.” 

– Caitlin Patler

Associate Professor, Goldman School of Public Policy

Dr. Patler’s research examines U.S. immigration and criminal laws, legal statuses, and law enforcement institutions as drivers of socioeconomic and health disparities. She has served as an expert in federal court cases related to immigration policy and her research has been cited in the U.S. Supreme Court and in Federal rulemaking. Dr. Patler has collaborated in research-practice partnerships with local, state, and federal organizations working to advance immigrants’ rights through policy.

Faculty Member: Daniel J. Sargent

Topic: Foreign Policy

It is a truism that American elections are seldom decided on foreign policy. Exit polls from Tuesday’s election reaffirm this point: foreign policy influenced few voters’ choices. The scale of Donald Trump’s victory, moreover, suggests that different decisions on major foreign policy issues would not have shifted the outcome. Instead, this election appears to have hinged primarily on voters’ anxieties over economic issues and immigration.

Yet, while foreign policy did not determine the election, the United States’ role in the world emerged as a crucial subtext—perhaps the crucial subtext—of Trump’s campaign and, more broadly, his trajectory in presidential politics. To fully appreciate this, we must consider the historical context.

Since the early 1940s, American foreign policy has intertwined the welfare and security of the United States with that of the wider world. Successive leaders have pledged resources—and American lives—to defend the “Free World” and uphold the “liberal international order.” The results have varied widely: the U.S. overthrew Saddam Hussein, bringing chaos to Iraq, but also led global health initiatives, fighting HIV/AIDS in Africa and sharing Covid vaccines, potentially saving millions of lives.

Trump has long been a critic of American internationalism. As early as 1987, he denounced U.S. commitments to defend Japan and Europe as wasteful uses of taxpayer dollars. Since his descent down the golden escalator in 2015, Trump has consistently argued that U.S. policy should prioritize Americans first, with other nations bearing the costs of their own security.

Although Trump himself has been outspoken, his first administration included establishment figures like General James Mattis, who shared more conventional internationalist views. This tempered “Trump 1.0” and prevented a significant reorientation of U.S. foreign policy toward the “America First” vision Trump espoused.

“Trump 2.0,” however, may prove different. Trump’s 2024 campaign was more disciplined than his efforts in 2016 or 2020, and he has already appointed a close associate as chief of staff, signaling his commitment to transforming American policy. Key appointments and early policy decisions will set the tone.

The initial policy issues are evident. Trump is likely to focus on trade and monetary policy, particularly as the strength of the U.S. dollar poses a challenge to his goal of boosting U.S. exports. Shifting trade terms in favor of American firms and workers may necessitate more drastic actions, including tariffs.

Also expect decisive moves on Ukraine and Israel, the primary foreign policy flashpoints of 2024. On Ukraine, Trump may push for negotiations to end Kyiv’s war of resistance against Russia’s invasion. Critics will decry any cession of the Donbas to Russia as capitulation, but a peace deal could halt the devastation in eastern Ukraine and—if Trump’s diplomats are effective—facilitate Ukraine’s integration into Western institutions, especially the European Union, over the long term.

Trump’s policy toward Israel is more challenging to predict. A close ally of Benjamin Netanyahu, Trump’s election alleviates pressure on Israel to resolve conflicts in Gaza and Lebanon, at least during the transition period. However, his efforts to build relations between Israel and the Gulf states through the Abraham Accords were a signature achievement of his first term, and this framework could still underpin constructive regional diplomacy.

If Trump truly aspires to a Nobel Peace Prize, he might consider spending some of his political capital to help end the long-standing Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which has wrought significant human suffering. By pressuring Netanyahu and potentially persuading the Emiratis and Saudis to assume responsibility for Gaza, he could achieve a diplomatic breakthrough. While such an outcome is uncertain, Trump’s election opens the door for meaningful shifts in foreign policy—along with the possibilities, and risks, of change.

– Daniel J. Sargent 

Associate Professor of History and Public Policy 

Dr. Sargent is a historian who specializes in U.S. foreign policy and the history of international relations. His research has explored how states and decision makers adapt to long-term changes in their international environments, including the historical advance of globalization.